Privacy tiers — what each Space protects, and what you choose
Every Space is private by default. On top of that you make one choice per room — which tier runs its turns — and can switch on a few more protections. This page lists each one: what it hides, from whom, and its status today.
Check the claims yourself: Verify it yourself. The full status map: Status.
Every Space, always
Nothing to configure; these hold for every room.
| Protection | What it means |
|---|---|
| Sealed storage | The store holds only ciphertext sealed to the room key. There is no operator recovery key, so nothing on the platform can read it. |
| Keys in a worker | Room cryptography runs in a key worker on the user's device; in the hosted app it runs in the vault, so the frame that draws the screen never holds a key. See the app as an operating system. |
| Locked egress | The app in the browser can reach only a published list of hosts; the browser refuses everything else. |
| Signed, reproducible build | Each deployed origin publishes a signed /cert.json binding its exact bytes to published source that rebuilds to the same hash. |
The choice per room: Confidential or Standard
| Confidential | Standard | |
|---|---|---|
| Where a turn runs | A measured AWS Nitro enclave. Your app verifies it before sealing the room key to it. | Our server-side render. |
| Who can read a turn while it runs | No one outside the enclave — not us, not AWS. | Our render, while a member is active. |
| The model | Open-source models on confidential-compute inference, reached only through an attested no-log gateway; refused if the gateway does not attest. | Frontier models. The turn goes to the model's vendor. |
| Storage at rest | Sealed | Sealed |
| Status | Production, always on | Production |
Choose Confidential unless the room needs a frontier model. Choose Standard for a frontier model, and tell the room's members what that trade is. The tier is set per room by the app builder. How the confidential room works, link by link: the trust model and the attested tier.
Protections you can switch on
| Protection | What it hides or prevents | From whom | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Verified membership | Reading or posting with only the link — every read and write needs an allow-listed sign-in (email or @username). |
Anyone holding the link | Production, per room |
| Hide my IP | Which IP address is using which room. Requests go through an attested relay (OHTTP): the relay sees your IP but only ciphertext; our servers see the room but not your IP. | Witbitz's servers and the network path | Production, a user setting |
| No notifications | That, and when, you received a message. | Apple, Google and the push service | Production — push is off until the user turns it on |
| Device protection | Keys and cached messages at rest on the device: everything is sealed under a passkey and opened only after an unlock. | Someone, or malware, reading the device's storage | Production — required on computers, optional on phones |
| Attested room | A modified or unreleased app taking part: every read and turn must come from a release in the public log (the chain). | A tampered client | In the browser: the Witbitz-served level (proves the version, not the device). Hardware-attested phone apps: Design |
| Client verification | A swapped or leaky app in your own browser: a verifier checks the release and enforces its locks. | Whoever serves the app | Implemented, not on by default |
"Hide my IP" cannot hide your address from the companies that deliver the app itself — Cloudflare when the page loads, Apple or Google for push and sign-in. Only a device-wide VPN or Tor hides it from them, and it works alongside the relay.
Not built yet
- Traffic shaping (Design). Message sizes, timing and access patterns remain visible to the network path, in both directions. Hiding them takes a client half (fixed-size writes, constant cadence) and a server half (fixed-size replies).
- Hardware-attested phone apps (Design). The server's verifiers for Apple App Attest and Android key attestation are built; the native apps are not released.
What no setting hides
- The endpoint. Plaintext has to exist on a device for a person to read it. A compromised device — a keylogger, a screenshot, malware — is outside every software guarantee.
- The frontier model's vendor, in a Standard room. That is the trade the tier names.
- Availability. We can refuse service. Sealed storage is a claim about reading, not about access forever.
Running it in your own boundary, or with no outside network at all: deployment options and air-gap. What the Spaces app turns on, and where its settings are: privacy in the Spaces app.
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